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ABSTRACT 
 Highly biographical Modernist author profiles on Facebook seem to adopt 
or encourage a purely biographical, Genius Cult-esque understanding of the 
relationship between an author and that author's work. This is initially problematic, 
as authorial intent is a particularly complex issue of consideration for many of the 
authors currently haunting Facebook. This article thus establishes the paradoxical 
view on author-ity of three such authors – T. S. Eliot, Marianne Moore, and James 
Joyce – and examines how such Facebook profiles undermine and simplify the 
arguments made by these authors both through their critical and creative works. It 
then suggests that, by mere nature of being present on Facebook, these profiles may 
indeed engage in teasing out the very same paradox that these Modernists proposed 
in the first place, using Derrida's Hauntology to examine Facebook as a textual space 
both of biography and self-prosthesis. The argument ultimately seeks to propose 
that all Facebook users are indeed just such spectres haunting digital spaces. 
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I began with the desire to speak with the dead. 
—Stephen Greenblatt,  
Shakespearean Negotiations 
 
There are spectres haunting Facebook: the spectres of Modernism. In the spring of 2017, while 
perusing my Facebook news feed, I was struck by a haunting experience. A few stories down the 
feed, nestled between my brother’s vacation photographs and the typical polemic against neo-
liberal capitalism from one of my Marxist brethren, T.S. Eliot had posted a new comment on one 
of my friends’ Timelines. This is not to say that someone had posted a line from T.S. Eliot. Eliot 
himself had posted a new comment in the 21st century. 
 Obviously, as a Modernist scholar, my curiosity was immediately piqued. I was aware, of 
course, that anyone could create a Facebook profile with any name and any characteristics she 
chose, and thus there were likely profiles for any number of dead individuals; but seeing Eliot 
pop up in my news feed, as an active Facebook user alongside so many colleagues and friends, 
was nevertheless startling. Upon investigation, I found that there were many profiles for Eliot, 




Modernist and otherwise. Many of these are “dead profiles” – they were started and abandoned, 
showing no signs of having been edited for years. But regardless of why they were created or 
what their activity status may be, the fact remains: there is a Modernist phantasmagoria 
haunting Facebook. 
 As of May 2017 (when I first started collecting data on these), there were 13 T.S. Eliots, 
10 Marianne Moores, and 25 James Joyces – this after cutting out any profiles which are 
Modernists-in-name-only, e.g. the profile-curator happens to be named James Joyce, or she uses 
Marianne Moore as a pseudonym out of admiration but otherwise uses the profile as her own 
profile with no apparent attempt to make the profile particularly Moorish.1 There are profiles 
for any number of other canonical Modernist authors – e.g. Ezra Pound, Hart Crane, H. D. – but 
the number of publicly viewable profiles and the amount of detail therein for other authors was 
limited in contrast to those analysed here. Presumably this is largely a case of canonicity, and 
thereby celebrity within literary circles – a point worthy of further analysis, but beyond the 
scope of my argument here. I should also note that, though Virginia Woolf was a part of my 
research – and is perhaps the most popular(-ous) Modernist on Facebook, with 152 profiles – 
she was unfortunately cut from this analysis for length concerns; and it was she who was cut 
because an inordinate number of the Woolf profiles focus on Woolf as informed by her 
character in the movie (or, less often, the book) The Hours – e.g. dozens of Woolf profiles use 
stills of Nicole Kidman playing Woolf in the movie as the profile picture. Though this could add a 
fascinating level to the argument, it required excessive analysis not directly applicable to the 
other authors discussed. 
  The majority of these profiles are purely biographical details with little (or no) content 
or activity beyond a historical account of the authors’ lives: some admixture of the name, 
portraits, ‘Hometown’ (by which they almost uniformly mean birthplace), almae matres, 
profession, relationship status, gender, sexual orientation, and the like. The profile ‘Timelines’ 
generally outline the specific dates and life events of the authors, occasionally with quotes and 
additional author photographs. The profile ‘Thomas Stearns Eliot (T.s. Eliot)’, for example, 
merely contains the kind of biographical details one finds in his biographies by Peter Ackroyd or 
Craig Raine: it highlights St. Louis as his hometown and London as his ‘Current city’ (rather than 
East Coker); notes his education at Smith, Milton, Harvard, and Merton; marks his ‘Relationship 
status’ as ‘Married’ to Valerie and includes Vivienne in his ‘Family members’ as an aunt – there 
is no category for ‘ex-wife’ in Facebook; and outlines his employment history at Highgate School 
and The Egoist; among many other biographical details. These appear around and within the 
Timeline, which displays a long list of Eliot quotes interlaced with Life Events and photos of him. 
Similarly, the profile ‘Marianne Moore’ (a) lists her education, hometown, current city (Carlisle, 
PA rather than Gettysburg) in the ‘About’ section, along with a few Moore quotes, with Moore’s 
photo always looming in the corner.  
The effect of such biographical profiles is to embody the author of the quoted (and non-
quoted) works, to identify the hand which penned them and head which thought them up, and 
to give that body a context which conditioned the writing. By including quotes and material 
alongside places lived, places worked, places educated, etc., it implies that the biographic 
material is the source for understanding the author’s works, and suggests a certain level of 
“authority” the author holds over those words. It argues for a relevance in the birthplace, 
residences, academic backgrounds, employments, etc. for understanding the works which bare 
that author’s name, and thus creates an indelible and largely one-directional semiotic link to the 
author’s works from that author’s life and intents.  
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For a Modernist critic, however, profiling authors in such a biography-heavy way is 
initially quite problematic. As Marshall et al. (2020 p. 29) point out, analysis of artistic 
“personae” (the title of one of Pound’s early poetry collections) was explicitly part of the early 
20th century Modernist movement Imagism, which sought “a poetic language that produced a 
persona or character that was beyond the authorial identity”. This is not to say that Modernism 
as a whole positions a strong divide between author and work, but rather, as will be established 
in the following section, that Modernists and Modernism tend to take a highly ambivalent view 
of the relationship between the author and the text. And though I will complicate this in the final 
half of this essay, highly biographical profiles of Modernist authors seem to unnecessarily 
simplify this into univalence and encourage intentional and biographical readings of works that, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, dedicate ample text to questioning this very practice. 
MODERNIST AUTHORITY 
These authors, of course, do not have a uniform attitude in this regard; however, almost all of 
them (particularly the ones discussed here) have a paradoxical, or at least ambivalent, attitude 
about author-ity, both emphasizing and rejecting it simultaneously. And, fittingly, the critical 
methods of the New Critics – the critical progeny of Modernist literature – are largely invested 
with the theoretical approaches to text outlined in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s (1946) “Intentional 
Fallacy” and later Roland Barthes’s (1977) “Death of the Author,” largely rejecting biographical 
readings and authorial intentional primacy over interpretation. Largely, that is, along with a 
continual anxiety about this loss of grounded, authoritative “truth” or control. 
Eliot 
Authority is perhaps easiest to identify in Eliot, if only because he wrote such a large body of 
criticism and theory. Eliot’s poetics, as outlined most succinctly in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent,” are much akin to Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogism, in which Eliot suggests that artistic 
production involves a “historical sense”; that is, “what happens when a new work of art is 
created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The 
existing monuments form an idea order among themselves, which is modified by the 
introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them” (Eliot 1921, p. 44). It takes 
little effort therefrom to extrapolate a nascent intertextual theory, in which the meaning behind 
any text relies on its relationship to other texts, and thereby this text is produced through an 
infinite collaborative authorship rather than by a single person. And because its meaning is 
formed through its relationship with texts that precede, coincide, and exceed it in time, 
interpretation of the text in a given moment (whether by the author or anyone else) does not 
establish authority or authenticity for that text. 
This idea is reiterated much later in Eliot’s career, in the 1946 German radio broadcast 
“Die Einheit der Europäischen Kultur,” later translated into English and added as an appendix to 
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (from whence I draw the subsequent references). 
Therein he notes the influence of French poetry from Baudelaire to Valéry on the poetry of W. B. 
Yeats, R. M. Rilke, and himself, and subsequently (or perhaps pre-sequently) the influence of E. 
A. Poe on this French tradition (Eliot 1948, p. 112). He thereafter notes that, if we were to 
expand our scope from individual authors to all of European poetry, we would “find a tissue of 
influences woven to and fro” (Eliot 1948, p. 112). Much like his earlier comments from 
“Tradition” – “No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone” (Eliot 1921, p. 44) 
and any one poem must be conceived “as a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been 
written” (p. 48) – this clearly demonstrates a focus shifted off of the individual artist and onto 




collaborative work of an innumerable plurality of artists. It is not at all coincidental, as Harding 
(2017, p. 2) points out, that Eliot “instructed his literary executrix not to facilitate the writing of 
any biography of him”.  
Eliot’s poetry demonstrates this as well. Any one page of Eliot’s The Waste Land is so 
clearly multi-authored that it is difficult to give Eliot unique authoritative credit. Eliot wrote 
parts of the title, epigraph, and first page of “The Burial of the Dead,” of course, but so did 
Chaucer, Petronius, Jessie Weston, Sir James Frazer, Marie Larisch, Richard Wagner, the 
Anglican Church, and a few Christian scribes. Add one more page and you include more from 
Weston and Frazer and Wagner, along with Dante, Aldous Huxley, A. E. Waite, Shakespeare, 
Joseph Conrad, and Leonardo da Vinci. As such, any hermeneutic investigation which seeks 
explanation in the biography of “the” author of the text devolves into an infinite game of deferral 
along the infinite network of authors whose pens have effectively written it. Eliot’s response to 
any attempt to investigate meaning through the author – what he calls his “Impersonal theory of 
poetry” – is the New Critical response: “Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed 
not upon the poet but upon the poetry” (Eliot 1921, p. 47). 
However, at the same time as Eliot makes such claims and employs such stylistic 
resistances against biographic authoritative investigation, he also demonstrates a clear 
resistance to ungrounding any text from its author, and is thus far from the Scriptor-esque2 
postmodern view of later in the century. In The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, while 
considering the common practice (at least in the 1920s-30s) of setting a strong division 
between Wordsworth’s poetry and his general opinions external to it, Eliot (1959, p. 87) writes, 
“I am not sure that this critical eclecticism cannot go too far; that we can judge and enjoy a 
man’s poetry while leaving wholly out of account all the things for which he cared deeply, and 
on behalf of which he turned his poetry to account.” The very title of “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent,” where he outlines his “Impersonal theory of poetry,” indicates the 
paradoxical irony of his view. True, it emphasizes the role of “Tradition” – other works, other 
authors – in the construction and interpretation of any given work, and thus demonstrates an 
intertextual plurality of authorship. But it also emphasizes the individual, the author of a given 
work, and that person’s “talent” as a unique quality about that person which authoritatively 
shapes the text. Eliot’s critical writing, despite its dialogic leanings, still maintains some focus on 
the role of the author in creating the work rather than the work wholly creating a Barthesian 
Scriptor. 
Moore 
Other Modernist authors are less explicit about their textual theory, but no less paradoxical. 
Marianne Moore’s poetics, for instance, are never written explicitly in criticism about text-as-
such, but rather arise from her vast body of criticism of other authors’ works while she was 
writing literary reviews for little magazines like The Dial, Contact, Poetry, and Broom. Though 
she does note, in a 1921 review of Stewart Mitchell’s Poems, that “in so far as a poem is a work 
of art, one does not wish to know, and must not know too definitely, the facts which underlie the 
expression” (Moore 1986, p. 62), such disconnections of authoritative background from the 
author’s creative output are rare. In her 1924 review of Wallace Steven’s Harmonium, for 
instance, she famously states, “The better the artist, […] the more determined he will be to set 
down words in such a way as to admit of no interpretation of the accent but the one intended” 
(Moore 1986, p. 96), thus quite explicitly ensconcing her hermeneutic theory in authorial intent. 
Her reviews of W. C. Williams’s works are even more heavily invested in the Genius Cult of the 
Author, suggesting “it is only one who is academically sophisticated who could write [Williams’s 
poetry]” and later considering Williams’s scientific background (as a trained physician) as 
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fundamental to understanding his writing (Moore 1986, pp. 56, 157). Harter (2013, pp. 335-
336) argues that both in her review work and in her early poetry, Moore’s writing is deeply 
invested in an “I” which Harter identifies as unambiguously the author herself, and thus that 
there is a highly subjective and personal connection between the text and its author. 
 Moore’s poetry, however, complicates this view even more than Eliot’s does – even the 
earlier poetry (pace Harter). Her “A Marriage” and “An Octopus” in particular demonstrate an 
intertextual collage of numerous authors, to the extent that rather little of the poetry can be 
argued to be original at all; and she thereby suggests an intertextual theory in which no text is 
wholly original to that author – the poems are, quite literally, Barthesian “tissue[s] of 
quotations” (Barthes 1977, p. 146). Indeed, as Bazin (2010, p. 130) notes, Moore’s heavy use of 
“quoted fragment displaces the speaker, disrupting her authority as the locus of meaning”3. 
Moore, like Eliot, is not wholly on one side or the other of the argument over the relationship of 
an author’s own biography and thoughts about her work; both are clearly conflicted over how 
they imagine this relationship. As such, critical examinations of Moore’s biography or authorial 
intent which attempt to illuminate her poetry are excessively reductive of how her own work 
struggles with the issue of authorship. 
Joyce 
Joyce holds a more blatantly ambivalent attitude about the connection between author and text. 
Budgen (1943/1972) provides a highly biographical reading of Ulysses in 1943, James Joyce and 
the Making of ‘Ulysses’, largely informed by Budgen’s conversations with the author while Joyce 
was writing it; and Joyce was reportedly delighted at its publication (Bowker 2012, p. 463), 
suggesting that he encouraged such biographical readings. Joyce’s oft-quoted reason for not 
providing his explanatory schemas to whoever requested them – “If I gave it all up immediately, 
I’d lose my immortality. I’ve put in so many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors 
busy for centuries arguing over what I meant” (Ellmann 1982, p. 519) – clearly centers the text 
on authorial intent. Furthermore, as Jonathan Goldman argues in Modernism is the Literature of 
Celebrity, Joyce’s stylistic experiments (for example changing from vignette style in the 
“Wandering Rocks” episode to the musical overture style in “Sirens”) point decidedly toward 
authoritative intentionality beyond the novel itself: “The stylistic changes in Ulysses, by 
continually asking readers to guess Joyce’s extradiegetic rationale for that change, create the 
idea of the author” (2011, pp. 61-62). Continuing soon thereafter, “In such a system the author 
functions as not only the origin of the novel but also the last critical word on its meaning” 
(Goldman 2011, p. 63).  
However, this authorship is discursive rather than biological, a Foucaultean author-
function born of the text rather than vice-versa. The very idea of “immortality” from the Richard 
Ellmann quote above clearly suggests an authorship which is not bound by the corporeal 
author, suggesting that the authoritative source becomes abstracted, spectral. Goldman 
additionally suggests that Joyce  plays with this desire to connect the author (author-function 
arising from the text) with the corporeal person (“historical” Joyce, in Goldman) via Stephen’s 
ready-made association as a diegetic Joyce stand-in. Goldman is here drawing on a well-founded 
assumption taken largely for granted in Joyce scholarship: Stephen is an ersatz Joyce, an 
autobiographical character giving Joyce himself a voice within Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man and Ulysses. The heavy use of verbs in the imperative mood throughout the “Scylla and 
Charybdis” episode, Goldman argues, becomes an overdetermination of Joyce-as-author 
commanding Stephen’s actions and Stephen-as-Kunstlerromanner commanding Joyce-as-
author’s memory. E.g. the narration-cum-stream-of-consciousness line, “Local colour. Work in 




(Joyce) instructing himself as a character (Stephen) how to proceed with his argument or the 
character instructing himself as an author how to write the remainder of the scene. In either 
case (or in both simultaneously, for Goldman), one can no longer understand the author as 
embodied, but rather a constructed figure born from the text, born of its writing. Thus, Goldman 
(2011, p. 64) argues,  
Joyce’s manipulation of the trope of the autobiographical figure makes it 
impossible to locate the author of Ulysses within a character, within a diegetic 
body. Stephen Dedalus makes it impossible, then, for readers to embody the 
author, to locate the author as subject within a physiological object. 
The “Scylla and Charybdis” episode of Ulysses, from which Goldman’s analysis above 
draws, is a paradoxical examination of authorship broadly – and the episode title is apt, 
referencing a sort of Catch-22 in navigating a patch of Mediterranean water in Greek mythology. 
The episode is structured around Stephen’s argument for a highly biographical reading of 
William Shakespeare’s life into Hamlet against a group of dissenters. As Stephen makes his 
connections between Shakespeare’s son Hamnet and the character Hamlet and muses on his 
second best bed,a Russel notably dismisses his biographical readings: “All the rest [everything 
which is not the artwork itself] is the speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys” (Joyce 1990, p. 
185); and he suggests that such authorial details are “Interesting only to the parish clerk. I 
mean, we have the plays. I mean when we read the poetry of King Lear, what is it to us how the 
poet lived?” (Joyce 1990, p. 189). And later, when Eglington asks Stephen, “Do you believe your 
own theory?” Stephen responds, quite simply, “No” (Joyce 1990, pp. 213-214).  
But Russel’s very repeated insistence on intention – “I mean” – draws attention back to 
the author of a text (written or spoken) as the primary source of meaning behind that text, such 
that the author of his statements is reasserting his own need to clarify his authoritative meaning 
in an argument that the author is not the source of meaning. And soon after dismissing his own 
theory, in a stream-of-consciousness section, Stephen furthers this equivocation: “I believe, O 
Lord, help my unbelief. That is, help me to believe or help me to unbelieve?” (Joyce 1990, p. 
214). Stephen’s expression of doubt is just that: not dismissal, but dilemma, a superimposition 
of two seemingly irreconcilable attitudes about such authorial readings. Hence, yet again, the 
problem with highly biographically-structured Facebook profiles: they put an emphasis on 
authorial biography, on understanding the author through the details of that author’s life; and 
by connecting the author with the author’s works (nearly all of the profiles list or quote from 
the authors’ works), such profiles suggest that this understanding of the author through the 
biographical details is a source of meaning for those works, without recognizing that the 
authors being profiled therein criticize this very practice, both critically and creatively.4 These 
profiles encourage an understanding of textual interpretation based on Stephen’s initial stance 
and are unnecessarily dismissive of the alternative, resolving the paradox by ignoring one of the 
paradoxical stances rather than engaging with the paradox which fundamentally structures the 
text itself. A purely biographical reading of authorship essentially erases Charybdis from the 
titular metaphor and renders this chapter, this challenge in the journey, pointless. It becomes 
merely a patch of calm water through which Ulysses sails by Scylla effortlessly. 
The argument is not that Joyce, Eliot, or Moore was staunchly for or against biographical 
readings of authorship into the work, but that they struggled with the dilemma, and that this 
struggle is fundamentally part of their work, whether explicitly or implicitly. The point, as 
                                                             
a In his will, Shakespeare left his “second best bed” (and nothing else) to his wife Anne Hathaway. His first best 
bed is never mentioned. 
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Chekhov is famous for having said (but never did),b is not that it has an “answer” but that it 
“raises questions” about reading an interpretation; and the creation of such Facebook profiles 
encourage purely biographical readings of texts which explicitly draw into question such 
readings. 
DE-AUTHORIZING BIOGRAPHY 
Modernist biographies broadly thus risk a similar problem, as they can easily reduce this 
paradoxical superimposition – of both adhering to authoritative hermeneutics and eschewing it 
– purely to the former;5 and as such, they can and often do diminish the complexity of the 
author-text relationship which these texts and their authors introduced during the Modernist 
era. Eliot biographies often reduce the “tradition” (the intertextual structuration) and 
overemphasize the “individual talent” (the Genius) of the poet; Moore biographies often focus 
purely on the moderator of her poetic conversations rather than the conversants; Joyce 
biographies often uncritically and dismissively resolve the very dilemma of biographic authority 
his works analyze. 
 However, we also must be vigilant against the assumption that biographical details, or 
profiles such as these, are in fact purely indicative of the corporeal organisms which they 
purportedly depict. Importantly, a biography is not the person biographed. It is a record, an 
archive; and as an archive, biography functions through the same principles and mechanisms of 
archive theory. While relying on a grounding in some physis (here the corporeal author), 
biography simultaneously does what Derrida (1995, p. 7) calls “archival violence” to the 
material it archives by removing it from the physis and encoding it into the nomos and techne of 
the text – which is to say, of text. There must be a relational connection between the signifier 
archival biography and a signified physis-based organic person, such that a reading of the 
biography is understood to be a reading of the biographed person; and the biography 
simultaneously must – as biography, as non-organic text – be wholly separate and different 
from that organic person. Thus, as Derrida (1995) suggests, the biography comes to supplant 
the person, such that the signified-person is defined and hermeneutically understood via the 
signifier-text; and, thereby, the biography simulacrally comes to take primacy and originality in 
the semiotic relationship between the two.6 Any attempt to “know” Marianne Moore does not 
investigate the bones and decayed organic materials buried in the Gettysburg soil; it 
investigates the archival records which are associated with them, which bear the same name, 
and then come to define those remains, such that the remains themselves become signifiers 
reliant on the archival Moore for meaning. But without a grounding in the corporeal author, the 
archival text also loses its grounding or perceived validity, as it needs to be an archive of 
something or someone in order to be biographical or archival at all. A corporeal hand, when 
composing these Modernist works, necessarily had to be holding the pen. 
 This inherently complicated relationship between biological author and biographical 
author, between Author and Scriptor, is precisely the point of the overdetermined attitude of 
these Modernist authors about biographically and authoritatively based hermeneutics. The 
Shakespearean debate in Ulysses, in particular, examines just this paradox: Russell’s insistence 
                                                             
b The quote, which is as ubiquitous as any quote available online, is generally thus: “The role of the artist is to 
ask questions, not answer them.” Chekhov is quoted as having said this everywhere from Facebook to 
Goodreads to UBC’s Department of Theatre and Film website. Nowhere in Chekhov’s letters, fiction, or drama 
does this line appear in any text or translation I have been able to locate. It is, at best, a very loose paraphrase of 
two 1888 letters he wrote to A. S. Suvorin (see Chekhov 1920, pp. 88-89, 99-100). This being said, the idea that 
a contemporary discursive Chekhov is saying things which the corporeal author appears never to have said is apt 




on focusing on “the plays” and ignoring “how the author lived” is ultimately based on a rejection 
of biological authority, such that the “author” he is referring to is the decayed remains now 
buried in Holy Trinity Church in Stratford. He is understanding Shakespeare’s final will and 
testament (whence the “second best bed” reference comes) to have a concrete semiotic 
relationship with the once-living person – as it must if it is to be understood as a “Will” at all. But 
the will is as much a text as the plays are; and thus, by his own logic, because we “have the 
[will],” it too must be interpreted as text. By pluralizing the word “plays,” Russell is implicitly 
recognizing a relationship between multiple works which are linked through their authorial 
imprimatur; and thus, logically, the last will and testament of “William Shakespeare” necessarily 
holds just such a relationship with other texts bearing that imprint. The will, logically, must be 
read into the plays as an intertext. 
Russell’s rejection of a “will” in order to argue against author-based hermeneutics is 
thus doubly ironic. A will is a textual representation of just that – authorial will, desire, intention 
– and one which is precisely an extension of that desire and intention beyond the author’s 
presence. His dismissal of reading the will into the plays therefore represents a rejection of 
reading the corporeal author’s life and intentions in favor of a New Critical reading of a 
synchronic textual present. But in order to do so he must understand the will through a wholly 
different textual condition: the will must accurately represent the corporeal person, must be a 
textual signifier absolutely referencing the signified intentions of its author diachronically 
(through time). But as William Shakespeare does not corporeally exist in the present moment, 
what the will ends up referencing is actually itself, as it is the only present object through which 
William Shakespeare’s intentions are declared and can be interpreted in the synchronic 
moment. Russell’s grounds for rejecting the will’s relevance are founded on its ability to deliver 
intended meaning and accurately represent the corporeal author diachronically, at the same 
time as he is arguing that texts should only be read synchronically. 
On both accounts, of course, Russell is correct. Text cannot be understood in a perfect 
signifier-signified relationship with its corporeal author and her intentions, as the author, 
immediately after the moment of writing, ceases to be living in that state or expressing those 
intentions; and thus, as Barthes (1977) argues, the text becomes its own Scriptor, an archival 
record of a thing which has ceased to exist outside of the archive of itself. But as the text 
logically must have been written by a corporeal author who had some intention of a meaning 
behind what she was recording, and as the social situation of an author (e.g. employment, 
education, and places she has lived) undoubtedly shapes that person’s thoughts and 
expressions, the text must naturally carry with it an implicit sense of the author’s life and 
intentions as influential on her writings, even if this life and these intentions are only spectrally 
present through text. An author’s name, indeed, is nothing more than a signifier; and as such, it 
builds meaning through synchronic intertextual relationship as much as any word does. 
Shakespeare’s plays only gain historicity through the application of his name and the 
intertextual relationship between his name on those plays and accounts of when he lived which 
are presently available. The author simultaneously must have been a person in the past, but must 
be a specter in the present in order for there to be an author at all. 
FACEBOOK SPECTRALITY 
And it is here that these Facebook profiles in fact engage in the very debate which they seem to 
problematically resolve, in that they demonstrate this spectral presence with a bizarre clarity. 
They demonstrate the traditional biographical understanding of the person represented and 
they demonstrate a synchronic Aktualisierung (“updating,” “reactivation”), 7 both establishing 
the rootedness in corporeal personhood and demonstrating how representations of that 
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personhood necessarily belong to a synchronic present. I will take a few Eliot and Moore 
examples (from among many) to demonstrate.  
Biographical Profiles 
“T.s. Eliot” is strictly biographical. For pictures, it holds only an image of Eliot’s classic middle-
aged bespectacled face alongside a bookshelf. For ‘Work’, it lists The Criterion. For ‘Education’, it 
indicates Harvard and Merton. ‘Current City’ lists London. The ‘Details about T.s.’ section holds a 
relatively long paragraph, written in the first-person, listing biographical details and influences: 
My name is T.S. Eliot, short for Thomas Stearns. I was born on September 26, 1888 
in St. Louis, Missouri. I attended Harvard and then went to graduate school at the 
Sorbonne, Harvard, and Merton College, Oxford graduating with a degree in 
philosophy. I then traveled to England and became a schoolmaster, bank clerk 
and eventually literary editor for the publishing house Faber & Faber. I later 
became a director. I created and edited the exclusive and influential literary 
journal Criterion. In 1927, I decided to become a British citizen and also entered 
the Anglican Church. I take pride in my stubbornness and will never compromise 
with the public. I believe poetry should represent the complexities of modern 
civilization in language. I am also well know [sic] for my influence in modern 
poetic diction. My poetry is inspired by the development of a Christian writer. My 
poem, The Waste Land, is a negative look at the horror encountered when 
searching for a higher world. Along with poems I also write plays. Some of my 
plays are Murder in the Cathedral, The Family Reunion, The Cocktail Party, The 
Confidential Clerk and The Elder Statesman. In my spare time when I am not 
working I like to relax and take a break from my busy life. I also need time off to 
help deal with my anxiety due to a rough childhood. Writing is my true passion 
and I would be nowhere without it. 
His ‘Favorite Quotes’ is merely a line from TWL. ‘Life Events’, fittingly, mentions only that he got 
married, eschewing any details about Eliot’s life deemed superfluous to the author-function (as 
it were). 
 “Marianne Moore” (a) similarly creates a biographical sketch. The single iconic image 
(an older Moore in her large-brimmed round hat), ‘Education’ (Bryn Mawr and Metzger), 
‘Current City’ (Carlisle) and ‘Hometown’ (Kirkwood), with few other details and no life events 
except for similar ‘Favorite Quotes’ from Moore herself and a similar (albeit more laconic) blurb 
for ‘About Marianne’:  
“I see no reason for calling my work poetry, except that there is no other category 
in which to put it.” I was raised in my grandfather's house with my mother. My 
mom is my best friend. I am single, always have been. I was a school teacher from 
1911-1915. I have always wanted to be an artist, but [I] guess I'm stuck as a poet. 
These profiles, notably, are author-specific, not person-specific, highlighting only basic 
biographical details and elements of their lives deemed relevant to their works; though they 
speak in a first-person present, there is a sense of insulation from the present world as dead 
authors, with little or no engagement with other people or events on Facebook or beyond in the 
time post-mortem. 
Aktualisierten Profiles 
By contrast, there are also a number of profiles which explicitly demonstrate their spectral 
presence. “Thomas Stearns Eliot (T.s. Eliot),” for instance, shares a picture and a link to the 




Lady and I”; has a Timeline post commenting “I  Philosophy and Sanskrit!”; comments 
(among the many quotes drawn from Eliot’s interviews and critical writings) “I don’t know if 
I’m being paranoid, but it seems like Bertrand Russell has a crush on my wife…….” with a link to 
a Bertrand Russell profile;c and contains a bevvy of images of Eliot throughout his life doing 
things both literary and not. Along with the general biographical details from the more 
traditional pages, it also lists post-mortem events (still spoken in first-person present) such as 
his star on the St. Louis Walk of Fame and the Tony awards for Cats. He also has 32 friends, both 
contemporary (e.g. Valerie) and present, spanning from Ukrainian artists to Indian film workers 
to Texan car enthusiasts. And in another profile, “Thomas Stearns Eliot (T.S. Eliot)” comments 
on the Timeline in present Facebook style, adding an emotion tag (“feeling hopeful”) to a 
December 1913 comment, “Just resigned from my teaching job. Hopefully I can earn a living 
lecturing and obtaining more review work! ”, doing location check-ins (e.g. Margate and the 
Albemarle Hotel), using slang (“OMG Time Magazine just wrote a review on my poem, ‘The 
Wasteland [sic]’!!!!”), and including a picture of Groucho Marx, noting that he is “feeling 
accomplished” at receiving it and Marx’s letter. 
There are equally aktualisierten Moores. “Marianne Moore” (b) tags that she is “feeling 
proud” with a picture of Jim Thorpe, posts that she “Got a Cat Named Buffy” – “the most 
adorable kitten ever!! I am in LOVE!!! ”, alerts her readers of the shut-down of The Dial (“I 
regret to inform you, my dear readers, that ‘The Dial’ has shut down because of financial 
reasons”), heavily hashtags her posts (“Just finished writing my 50th letter today! 
#addictedtowriting #justcuz #writerscramp”), and laments that her editor wouldn’t let her 
wear her hat in her profile picture before updating her profile picture the next day to a picture 
of herself in a hat for a “#selfiesaturday”. She also posts likes for contemporary digital cultural 
products like WGT Baseball and 101 Little Riddles (both Smart Phone games), and has back-
and-forth conversations on her Timeline with everyone from her brother to T.S. Eliot using 
Facebook writing style (albeit always grammatically correct), resplendent with emojis, 
excessive capitalizations, and long strings of exclamation points. Yet “Marianne Moore” (c), on 
the other hand, complains about the grammatical poverty of Facebook – “Everyone insists on 
forgetting the most basic grammar and punctuation on this site” – to which Elizabeth Bishop 
(her Friend) replies, “Indeed they do.” 
HAUNTOLOGY 
The effect of these aktualisierten profiles is blatantly spectral. The specter, as Derrida (1994) 
lays out in Specters of Marx, is an essentially semiotic condition to all ontological presence which 
has a perceived historicity, focusing primarily (due to the nature of the talk from which it 
developed) on authorship via the theory of Karl Marx, but also using the literary example of 
Hamlet’s father’s ghost. The ghost, Derrida (1994, p. 8) notes, is not seen; it embodies a suit of 
armor which is identified with the deceased Danish king. To some extent, the suit of armor 
functions as what Donna Haraway (1987, pp. 33-34) calls “prosthesis” in her “Manifesto for 
Cyborgs”: “[M]achines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves”, which is 
to say that the mechanical or digital accoutrements which one uses to function as one uses teeth 
to chew or feet to walk, or which one uses to identify oneself as one uses clothing or speech-
patterns or even one’s face, become equally appendages, not to the self but of the self, 
constituting the self as a sort of Deleuzean collective which includes elements traditionally 
identified as the self and the not-self – note the plural: “friendly selves”. Derrida’s theory, 
however, differs from Haraway in that the appendages are the whole of what can be seen or 
                                                             
c The profile is joking about a well-known affair Vivienne Eliot had with Russell, about which T. S. was either 
ignorant or tacitly permissive. 
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understood as the identifiable object, such that even when the corporeal self is removed (dies), 
the self continues unimpeded through its prosthesis, though necessarily “haunted” by a 
deceased corporeal self – or, rather, the abstracted identity of the corporeal self – which only 
continues to exist through its spectral presence within the prostheses. The author-self of these 
Facebook profiles, like the Danish king, is purely an absence, an invisible abstraction which 
haunts its present representations (like the ghost in the suit of armor) and thereby gives them 
an identity or meaning through deferral to that absence, to that non-present-presence, to that 
spectre.  
 Furthermore, as Derrida (1994, pp. 7, 11) notes, the spectre is always realized as a 
“revenant”, as a returning of something dead; but as such, as a wholly new thing: an 
Aktualisierung, both a diachronic “re-” and a wholly present “new”. It is perceived as a thing of 
the past, a dead thing from a dead discourse and a dead context, which paradoxically manifests 
in the present, speaks in the present, situated in a present discourse and, thereby, a present 
intertextual semiotic field, such that the meaning of its speech is constructed through present 
language and in reference to present existence. Eliot commenting on films and world events 
after his death, Moore metatextually critiquing the writing style of the medium in which she 
speaks: it is not that these exist spectrally only in Facebook – it is also a spectral move to 
postulate “What would Eliot think of Cats? What would Moore think of Facebook grammar?”; 
rather, what Facebook does is manifests the spectral commentary through the mouth of a 
revenant, and thereby reveals the spectrality of such postulations by drawing attention to the 
fact that any such postulations are inherently the speaking of a spectral author. Each utterance 
of “Moore”, again, is not referring to the corporeal material mouldering in Gettysburg, but rather 
the spectral Moore, the discursive Moore; they are as much Moore, the same (and yet a 
different) Moore as the author of her poetry and criticism. Each interpretation of Moore 
(whether profilic or poetic) is, in Derrida’s terms, both a different Moore and the same Moore – 
one among many, one spectral Moore amongst the phantasmagoria of spectral Moores haunting 
Facebook, which function singularly as a unified Moore through their intertextuality within that 
ghostly cacophony. All of them (plural) are a dead person (singular) whose spectre (both) now – 
every now, always now – speaks. 
 But it is important to note that the strictly biographical profiles, too, are contributing to 
that spectral intertextual unity. In the most simplistic terms, they are, like all the words and 
attitudes and character traits of Moore, the discursive presence of a past author, who must be 
understood both as the static “that to which they refer” and as a dynamic signifier who is 
intertextually defined through all the present discourses about her. But even if they are Moore 
speaking words which are recognized as being written by Moore in the more traditional sense, 
they are speaking them through a uniquely un-traditional medium, and that medium is 
inherently hauntological. Firstly, to speak on Facebook, to have a profile on Facebook, is 
fundamentally to speak and to be an active social agent in a present moment. And secondly, 
particularly for Facebook (as well as certain other social media platforms), that present moment 
is declaratively ever-present. Facebook’s algorithms and functionality are designed such that it 
is quite literally never the same text moment-to-moment, in a constant state of Aktualisierung. 
Matthew Kirschenbaum (2013, p. 60) notes that all digital texts are new texts every time a page 
or file is loaded from the bytes in storage: “[E]ach individual access creates the object anew.” 
For Facebook, however, this is compounded by the fact that each page is modifiable in any given 
moment by a series of different users, not only the creator of the persona. Any number of 
different users can post to a given profile Timeline, tag that profile in images or posts on 
another profile, or alter the myriad “friend” profiles or affiliation pages (e.g. the page for Merton 
College) which are linked to that profile, and thus these other profiles and organization pages 




speak of one infinitesimally immediate moment of its existence, or to speak of a constantly 
protean space of textuality, such that “Marianne Moore” the profile is only and always that 
profile at the very moment of its utterance. Every profile is born anew, aktualisierte, every 
moment it is loaded or refreshed. Thus even when a profile is not actively being updated by its 
user, the profiles are still in a constant state of alteration, such that the subject represented on 
those pages continues, constantly, to speak. Even for a more traditionally biographical profile, it 
is still intensely hauntological to say that T. S. Eliot posted on a Facebook Timeline in 2017, to 
say that Marianne Moore is someone’s Facebook friend in 2019. Ultimately, even the strictly 
biographical profiles, as Facebook profiles, are thus engaging in a deeply Modernist, paradoxical 
discussion of authorship. 
SPEAKING WITH THE DEAD 
In closing, I would like to propose further extensions beyond Modernism and suggest an 
implication behind this research for Facebook profiles in which the profiled user has died. There 
have been various analyses in recent years of the user/profile relationship in terms of deceased 
users. Hogan & Quan-Haase (2010 p. 311) argue that profiles are curated “exhibitions,” 
recordings of past expressions of the individual, not “living performance,” since (they argue) the 
death of the profile’s author leaves the profile to persist after them without newly-added 
material. That is, profiles do not give new performances; they are recordings of the past – albeit 
Hogan & Quan-Haase (2010, p. 312) do note that the pages serve thereafter as spaces of 
mourning, and thereby may go through a process of “reframing”. Ebert (2014) similarly posits 
that, though the page of a deceased user is written upon by mourners – specifically the timeline 
– the representation of that user doesn’t change. Stokes (2015 pp. 243), while agreeing with 
Ebert, takes issue with Hogan & Quan-Haase’s strong division between user and profile – 
between an “‘exhibition’ about the user” and “the user themselves.” Specifically, Stokes (ibid.) 
identifies ways in which “intersubjective person-identities” of deceased users continue to 
function, via the profiles, for other Facebook users. In one telling instance, Stokes (ibid.) notes 
that other users continue to post to deceased users’ walls and address them as other subjects in 
the second person; and drawing on a number of studies, he notes that “what they write is not 
simply rhetorical apostrophe: many users report that they do take themselves to be 
communicating with the dead.” Based on my analysis, however, I would suggest that the 
representation of the user does change; and in response to Stokes, I would further note that not 
only do users communicate with the dead, the dead talk back. 
In intertextual terms, Hogan and Quan-Haase’s argument that “dead” profiles do not 
exhibit “living performance” is an oversimplification. First, as noted above by Ebert and Stokes, 
the pages accumulate comments, tags, and posts from other users (often in “memorial” terms). 
Given, this does not add new data for certain aspects of the profile that cannot change after the 
sole possessor of the username and password is no longer able to alter this data – e.g. 
“Hometown” or “Work.” However, it does still add new data based on the social interaction of 
other users with that profile – e.g. timeline posts or tags in photos, places, and events; and as 
noted above, the identity of such a social persona8 is in no small part defined through others’ 
discursive interactions with it, particularly evident on Facebook where those discursive 
interactions are encoded textually within the profile Timeline. Furthermore, as argued via 
Derrida (1994) above, a text is only ever read, and thus is only ever spoken, in the present 
moment; its meaning is ever (re)established through the text’s intertextual relationship with 
other texts at the moment of its (re)iteration. If we therefore accept, as Eliot (1921) touches 
upon above and Jorge Luis Borges (1964, original Spanish 1939) more directly argues in his 
“Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” that a text changes, even says something different, 
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depending on the historical context of a given reading of it and the collected history of social 
engagement with it, then we must equally accept that the textually-born persona of such a 
Facebook profile gives a new, different performance of identity as its moment and social 
engagements change as well. Even after the death of the corporeal user, the persona, like 
Derrida’s spectral suit of armour, very well may continue to speak. 
Second, the profilic persona is not self-contained within the profilic data. All the data 
points in the profile are not inert; they point outward to establish the meaning of those data 
points, and what they point out to does not remain static. The Hometown, given, does not stop 
saying “St. Louis” (for both Moore and Eliot), but without a semiotic deferral to other iterations 
of “St. Louis,” the text is nothing more than electronically-rendered squiggles and lines on a 
screen. St. Louis only has meaning to the extent that it defers to other St. Louises, other 
iterations of that signifier and the ever-changing context of those other iterations – as points on 
a map, as news stories, as archival histories, as others who were also born there, as the 
hometown of Eliot (for Moore) and also the hometown of Moore (for Eliot). These deferrals 
come to inform what St. Louis means on Moore’s page and, thereby, shape a reader’s 
understanding of who Moore is. As St. Louis changes – as the intertextual meaning of “St. Louis” 
changes with new iterations and contexts of that signifier, as news stories move from its jazz 
scene in one year to racial protests in the Ferguson suburb in another – so do those profiles that 
use it as a data point in constructing their personae. Facebook profiles, again, make this process 
and its mutability overt, in that many of the data points hold hyperlinks to other pages (like the 
city page for St. Louis) that change over time. Clicking the hyperlinked “St. Louis” on many of the 
Eliot and Moore profiles one day brings up the same URL, but the page at that URL is not the 
same as it is on another day, with its own new data points that equally and necessarily point out 
as signifiers to other pages equally in flux. For Friends, this is even more evident, as the Friends 
list on a profile also holds thumbnails of each friend’s profile picture, which (like all other data 
points) is infinitely changeable by those users. Changing one’s profile picture makes an 
alteration, however slight, to the profile of every person one identifies as a Friend. A profile 
whereon many of the Friends images have rainbow flags one day says something different, 
performs a different image of the person, than the same profile on a different day when the 
Friends images all depict MAGA hats, even if the user of that profile makes no alterations. The 
persona undergoes changes whether the user is living or dead; it is a “living performance”. 
CONCLUSION 
In this sense, all Facebook profiles are haunted, whether the user is living or dead. As should be 
clear from the Modernists’ analyses of authorship and authority in vivo, as well as from Barthes’ 
(1977) arguments, the paradoxical relationship of author and text are not limited to the 
corporeal death of the author. Even the profiles of the living are, in a sense, a depiction of a past 
self, a “dead” self that continually performs the user’s selfhood even when her back is turned 
and in ways she does not control; a text over which she both does and does not hold author-ity. 
Those of us with Facebook profiles are all such authors in a sense; but rather than a singular 
author, I would suggest that it is a plurality of spectral author-selves speaking together through 
an archive which bears our name – a plurality of places, comments, actions, likes, friends and 
conversations with them; each of which is itself defined and determined through links with 
others who share that data in the semiotic field of that moment on social media; and each of 
which, as archival data, happened in the past, but is necessarily accessed in the present, such 
that each is rendered spectrally as one haunting among many in an always-aktualisierte 
depiction of selfhood. To borrow from Hayles (2005, p. 9), I would suggest that we, as social 




from all the texts participating in the cluster, without privileging one text as more ‘original’ than 
any other.”9 On Facebook, we are written – by ourselves, by others commenting on and tagging 
ourselves, by the multiplicitous past selves who have inscribed upon our Facebook profile – all 
functioning intertextually in a network of selves; and this intertextual cluster comes to write 
itself upon our corporeal self, much as the discursive Moore writes upon her bones. The legacy 
of Modernism’s preoccupation with the question of textual authority, when manifested through 
social media profiles, is to reveal that the author, the written my-self, is a spectral figure even 
before death, arising out of the intertextual network of my-selves which share a given 
synchronic moment, all conjuring my authorial persona through their conversation. 
1 A note on methodology:  
1) I performed a People Search for the author names (James Joyce, Marianne Moore, T.S. Eliot and Thomas 
Stearns Eliot, for those authors analysed here).  
2) I collected a list of every profile URL for each author and eliminated any URL repeats (which happened 
twice).  
3) I eliminated pages which were not clearly representative of the author according to the following criteria:  
3a) The profile had to use some iteration of the author’s full name (e.g. tseliot, Thomas S. Eliot).  
3b) The profile had to have a portrait or photograph of the author as the Profile Picture; or, if the Profile 
Picture was abstract (e.g. a Vorticist painting), the profile images had to have at least one photograph of the 
author and more than one piece of information biographically relevant to that author (e.g. residence as 
“Monk’s House” and occupation as “writer” for Woolf).  
4) The profile had to be publicly viewable (i.e. not limited to “friends-viewing only”). 
2 Cf. Barthes (1977), particularly “The Death of the Author” where he establishes this term. The “scriptor,” in 
short, is the “author” as determinate by the text alone or by its reading, “born simultaneously with the text” 
(p. 145); at the moment when “writing begins,” the author as traditionally understood “enters into his own 
death” (p. 142), such that the text itself holds its own author-ity: the scriptor. 
3 Intertextuality has been a relatively popular focus in Moore criticism (even moreso than for other 
Modernists) for at least the past few decades. See, among others mentioned in the text, Keller (1991), Sielke 
(1997), and Costello (2012). Though not referring to intertextuality, Gilbert (2018) and Finch (2018) address 
the relationship between her style and a complicated sense of authorial identity. Gilbert (2018) argues that her 
collage-style poetry is effectively the construction of a blazon of herself (or rather a narrative persona) through 
correlated fragments, and that her conception of identity broadly was similarly as a fragmentation. Finch (2018 
p. 229) argues that Moore’s poem “Tell me, tell me” argues for “a definition of personhood as a surface 
interwoven […which] ‘perplexes’ any notions of straightforward autobiography” lying behind Moore’s work. 
4 At the time of collecting and analyzing the profiles for this study, none of them referenced the authors’ 
attitude about biographical readings or authorial intent. However, as active and “living” profiles, it is possible 
that some may now or in the future have recognized this, or that new profiles may have been created that 
recognize this. 
5 As is discussed toward the end of this article, I do not mean to suggest that biography has no place in 
Modernist scholarship. Many Modernist biographies, importantly, construct their biographies while 
simultaneously recognizing the author’s complex attitude about that very practice. See, for instance, the 
ultimate chapter of Raine (2006) and introduction of Leavell (2013). However, most other Modernist 
biographers are silent on the issue of biographically analyzing the work of authors whose works criticize 
biographical readings, and thereby run into similar issues as biographical Facebook profiles discussed herein. 
Cf. Connor (2012), Bowker (2012), Ellmann (1982), and Ackroyd (1984), the last of whom received a rather 
critical review in the NYT which opens by noting this very dilemma: “Eliot himself left instructions that there 
should be no official biography” (Gross, 1984 p. 24). 
6 Derrida never states this explicitly in Archive Fever, but as Kamuf (2005) argues, the process of 
deconstruction in all of Derrida’s writing inherently presumes this process of preservation-as-destruction: to 
preserve a person is, indeed, both to archive him and to set his archive on fire (see in particular p. 40). Archive 
Fever is, after all, a speech given at a conference of the Freud Museum that contemplates the archival violence 
of archiving Freud. 
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7 I use the German term Aktualisierung because the various English translations it permits fold together nicely 
to describe these profiles. Aktualisieren is generally translated as “to update” in the sense of “taking 
something from the past and making it accurate for the present” (like a financial ledger), but it can also mean 
“to reactivate,” as Harry Zohn translates it in his English version of Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Benjamin 1968 & 1974, §II). Benjamin’s argument here is that the 
reproduction “reactivates/aktualisiert” the object it reproduces in different contexts. Thus while “update” has 
the sense of “altering the past to make it present,” “reactivate” has the sense of “making a thing work in the 
present as it did in the past.” The overdetermination here is apt, as it suggests both an integrity and a 
difference, both a sameness to the different iterations of an object and an alteration based on temporal 
context. Not at all coincidentally, “aktualisieren” is also the German verb used for “refreshing” web pages – a 
“re-loading” of the same, which needs alteration to accurately or (in an ironic way) “authentically” represent 
itself. 
8 It should be understood, also in intertextual terms, that a person’s online persona is not limited to a single 
profile on a single social media platform, but similarly arises from the interrelation of all profiles, comments, 
activities, publications, accounts, etc. associated with it in hyperspace (cf. Marshall, Moore, and Barbour, 2020, 
p. 20). I am limiting my focus to Facebook for the sake of this article’s discussion, and implicitly arguing that 
the same kind of intertextual persona-formation at that macro-level is also at play at this micro-level. 
9 Cf., among others, Turkle (1999), Barbour and Marshall (2012), Bollmer (2013), and Graham, Gibbs, and Aceti 
(2013), all of whom largely rely on this concept of the self or social persona as an assemblage or correlational 
plurality but do not position it explicitly in textual terms and focus more on macro-level assemblages from 
various platforms and mediations. 
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